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INTRODUCTION
Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end.
But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.
– Winston Churchill, 1942
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A

t 11:08 p.m. on September 21, 2011, amidst national and
international media attention, the state of Georgia killed Troy
1
Davis, despite evidence suggesting that he was not guilty. The U.S.
Supreme Court, while delaying Mr. Davis’s execution for a few
hours, failed to intervene. Unfortunately, Mr. Davis’s execution was
not unique or even unusual. Many are on death row or have gone to
2
their deaths despite questionable evidence,
prosecutorial
3
4
5
misconduct, jury selection problems, incompetent defense counsel,
6
defense counsel burdened by conflicts of interest, as well as other
7
procedural and due process defects. However, as reflected in the
media and public reaction to Mr. Davis’s death, his execution occurs
at an important juncture in the macabre world of capital punishment.
Mr. Davis’s death symbolizes the end of the beginning of America’s
failed experiment with the modern death penalty.
The United States has been executing people for thirty-five years
under the modern death penalty regime that killed Mr. Davis. For
much of that time, politicians and a majority of the American public
appeared to embrace capital punishment with great enthusiasm.
Slowly over the past ten years, however, America’s relationship with
capital punishment has frayed, and our conversation about the death

1

Kim Severson, Davis Is Executed in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, at A1.
For example, see the case of Todd Willingham executed in Texas in 2004. See David
Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute the Wrong Man, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at
42.
3 In 1998, Florida executed Willie Darden whose capital trial was rife with prosecutorial
misconduct. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
4 Florida killed Johnny Witt in 1995. The Supreme Court eased the standards for death
qualifying a jury in a death penalty case and thus rejected Witt’s claim that the trial court
committed constitutional error in dismissing certain jurors for cause based on their views
about the death penalty. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
5 Missouri executed Alan Bannister in 1997. Bannister’s lawyer rarely spoke with his
client prior to trial, presented no defense to the intentional murder charge, and in
sentencing presented no mitigating evidence. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY:
AN AMERICAN HISTORY 307–10 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002).
6 Virginia killed Walter Mickens even though defense counsel failed to disclose to
Mickens that counsel previously represented the murder victim. See Mickens v. Taylor,
535 U.S. 162 (2002).
7 Georgia killed Warren McCleskey in 1991. By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court
affirmed McClesky’s conviction and death sentence despite evidence of racial bias in the
death sentencing process of Georgia. Justice Powell, who voted with the majority in
McCleskey, later stated that if he could go back, he would change his vote in that case.
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451–52 (Charles Scribner’s Sons
1994).
2
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8

penalty has shifted. Doubts about the accuracy of convictions and
death sentences, worries about procedural safeguards, and questions
about the high cost of the death penalty have emerged. This
observation about the current state of the death penalty debate does
not mean that the death penalty is near its end; it is not, at least not
yet. But what does appear to be happening is that the country’s initial
infatuation with the death penalty is over and a new phase of the
modern death penalty has begun.
This shift not only may foreshadow the increased probability of
abolition of the death penalty at least in some parts of the United
States, but also it may play an important role in the development of
the Eighth Amendment and the protection of human rights. The
protection of human rights and human dignity is a dynamic process
engaging both democratic and judicial policy and decision-making
processes. This interplay is particularly interesting in light of the
9
10
recent actions of the legislatures of New Jersey, New Mexico, and
11
Illinois, which have now legislatively abolished the death penalty,
as well as the New York legislature’s decision not to revise its death
penalty statute after it was struck down by the New York Court of
12
Appeals.
In the parlance of the Eighth Amendment, the determination of
human dignity and the corresponding constitutional constraints on
government to protect that dignity depends on whether there exists an
evolving standard of decency reflecting the progress of a maturing
society that would limit or outright ban a particular form of
punishment such as torture or capital punishment under certain
13
circumstances. This long-standing, well-accepted principle reflects
8 It is of interest to note that a recent poll in California indicated that while sixty-eight
percent of voters support the death penalty, voters prefer life without the possibility of
parole to the death penalty by forty-eight percent to forty percent. Marisa Lagos, Field
Poll: Less Voter Support of Death Penalty, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29, 2011, at C2.
9 New Jersey abolished the death penalty in 2007. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3
(West 2007). For a discussion of the development of abolition in New Jersey see infra
Part IV.B.
10 New Mexico abolished the death penalty in 2009. See infra Part IV.A.
11 Illinois abolished the death penalty in 2011. See infra Part IV.C.
12 See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
13 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (prohibiting the imposition of life
without the possibility of parole on non-homicide juvenile offenders); Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for
ordinary offenders whose actions do not result in death); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976) (prohibiting mandatory death penalty); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
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an understanding that the Eighth Amendment is not static but rather
14
The
evolves to protect and reflect current human rights norms.
progression toward greater human rights protection under the Eighth
Amendment does not often come about simply because of some topdown decision-making process; rather, it usually arises out of the
efforts of a few individuals, lawyers, legislators, and organizations
committed to protecting human rights and dignity.
This Article examines the evolution of the death penalty in the
United States, focusing on the modern death penalty regime that the
U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned in 1976. As Mr. Davis’s execution
demonstrates, the conversation around the death penalty has
undergone a marked change in the last decade. Since 2007, a few
states have abolished the death penalty, signaling an important turning
point in America’s modern experiment with capital punishment. This
Article traces these developments and the effect they may have on the
future of the U.S. death penalty and the protection the Eighth
Amendment affords.

(1972) (prohibiting the death penalty in a system allowing unfettered jury sentencing
discretion); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878) (“Difficulty would attend the
effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides
that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that
punishments of torture, such as those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all
others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the
Constitution.”).
14 See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (“To determine whether a punishment is cruel
and unusual, courts must look beyond historical conceptions to “‘the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419
(asserting that whether the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment “has been
fulfilled is determined not by the standards that prevailed when the Eighth Amendment
was adopted in 1791 but by the norms that ‘currently prevail’”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (“[W]e have held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments
which are incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society’”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (“The Court recognized
in that case that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not
static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.” (citation omitted)); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (“This was the motive of the [Cruel and Unusual Punishment
C]lause, and if we are to attribute an intelligent providence to its advocates we cannot
think that it was intended to prohibit only practices like the Stuarts’, or to prevent only an
exact repetition of history.”). It is worth noting that Justices Scalia and Thomas have
questioned this application of the Eighth Amendment, although their position is a minority
view and inconsistent with doctrine spanning more than one hundred years. See, e.g.,
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2044–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
607–08 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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I
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
Long before the ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, societies, including those in the Americas, punished offenders
by killing them. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law,” reflecting a recognition of
government’s power to take a human life. Yet, the consideration and
application of the death penalty, even in early American history,
proved more complicated than simply recognizing and accepting that
15
governments could execute an individual as punishment.
Even in the late 1700s, Americans debated the morality,
16
appropriateness, and efficacy of the death penalty.
Of particular
note during this time period was On Crimes and Punishments and
17
Other Writings by Cesare Beccaria. Influenced by the philosophical
18
writings of the day, Beccaria, the son of an Italian nobleman,
advocated abolition of capital punishment and torture and proposed
19
graduated punishment for crimes.
At least in part as a result of
Beccaria’s writings, combined with the Enlightenment thinking that
influenced the framers of the Constitution, some prominent early
Americans, including Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, James Madison,
20
and Thomas Jefferson, advocated limiting the death penalty to the
21
most serious offenses.
Others, most notably Benjamin Rush,
15 For a discussion on the history of the death penalty in the United States and the
meaning and development of Eighth Amendment protections, see Furman, 408 U.S. at 257
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
16 GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789–1815, at 492–94 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009); Furman, 408 U.S. at 296–97 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
17 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1764).
18 WOOD, supra note 16, at 492–94.
19 See John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s
Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 196–203
(2009).
20 See LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776–1865, at 53–54 (Oxford Univ. Press
1989); WOOD, supra note 16, at 492. State constitutions appeared to embrace the idea of
more enlightened and proportional punishment, even though the constitutions did not
outright prohibit capital punishment altogether.
21 See MASUR, supra note 20, at 52–53; WOOD, supra note 16, at 493.
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strongly advocated for abolition of the death penalty altogether.
Republican ideals of the early United States, as well as Christian
tenets, served as a key impetus to the early death penalty debate and
23
opposition to capital punishment.
Perhaps reflecting this aspect of early American thinking, Alexis
de Tocqueville observed in the 1830s,
In no country is criminal justice administered with more mildness
than in the United States. While the English seem disposed
carefully to retain the bloody traces of the Middle Ages in their
penal legislation, the Americans have almost expunged capital
punishment from their codes. North America is, I think, the only
country upon earth in which the life of no one citizen has 24been
taken for a political offense in the course of the last fifty years.

Tocqueville found, however, that these principles of criminal justice
and compassion did not extend to slaves; to the contrary, enslaved
people in the United States continued to be subjected to “horrid
25
sufferings” and “barbarous punishments.”
The brutal legacy of
slavery and the pattern of differential and harsher treatment for
African Americans continued well into the twentieth, and indeed the
twenty-first, century.
As early as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, American
jurisdictions began rejecting the British mandatory death penalty
practice and started moving toward a procedure that provided for
26
judge or jury sentencing discretion. At least in part, the motivation
for such sentencing discretion arose out of the concern that a harsh
mandatory death penalty could cause juries to render a not guilty
27
verdict as the only way to spare the life of a guilty defendant.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, states
28
increasingly adopted discretionary capital sentencing systems.
An abolition movement to end capital punishment emerged in the
29
1840s, and a few states abolished capital punishment during this

22

MASUR, supra note 20, at 62–70.
WOOD, supra note 16.
24 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 176–77 (Henry Reeve trans.,
4th ed. 1840).
25 Id. at 177.
26 BANNER, supra note 5, at 9–10.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 214–15.
29 MASUR, supra note 20, at 117–24.
23
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30

time period. Michigan abolished the death penalty in 1847, Rhode
31
Island and Wisconsin abolished the death penalty in the 1850s, and
32
In the
Iowa and Maine abolished the death penalty in the 1870s.
late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court considered the
33
constitutionality of certain methods of execution. While the Court
34
35
upheld executions by firing squad and the electric chair, it
observed, “[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all
others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by [the
36
Eighth Amendment] to the Constitution.”
In the early twentieth century, fifteen states greatly restricted or
abolished the death penalty, although seven of these states reinstated
37
the death penalty within a few years. During the 1950s and 1960s, a
movement toward abolition reasserted itself as public support for
capital punishment declined and actual executions decreased. A few
38
states abolished or greatly restricted capital punishment, and by the
late 1960s, those jurisdictions that still retained the death penalty had
essentially stopped executions. A number of observers assumed that
39
the United States would just quietly phase out capital punishment.

30 BANNER, supra note 5, at 134. The most recent state to abolish the death penalty is
Illinois, which abolished the death penalty in 2011.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 220. Notably, Iowa reinstated the death penalty in 1878 and then abolished it
again in 1965.
33 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). It is
worth noting that at the time these cases were decided the Eighth Amendment had not
been incorporated to the states.
34 Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 132–33.
35 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 449.
36 Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136.
37 BANNER, supra note 5, at 222–23.
38 Id. at 221–23. New Mexico, New York, and Vermont partially abolished the death
penalty, and Iowa and Oregon abolished capital punishment altogether.
39 See Carol S. Steiker, Furman v. Georgia: Not an End, but a Beginning, in DEATH
PENALTY STORIES 95, 124 (John H. Blume & Jordan Steiker eds., 2009); Lyn Entzeroth,
The Challenge and Dilemma of Charting a Course to Constitutionally Protect the Severely
Mentally Ill Capital Defendant from the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV. 529, 537–38
(2011).
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II
EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY REGIME
It was against this background that the Supreme Court in 1972, in
40
Furman v. Georgia, examined whether the death penalty violated
the Eighth Amendment. Since states had discarded mandatory
41
sentences, the death penalty in place in the early 1970s allowed
juries complete or almost complete discretion to decide whether to
sentence the defendant to life or death. In Furman, the Supreme
Court ruled that this discretionary death penalty system was too
arbitrary, too capricious, and too unpredictable in its application; the
Court ruled that the system gave juries too much unrestricted and
unguided discretion to decide whether to allow the defendant to live
42
or die. As a result, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, concluded
that allowing unfettered discretion in imposing the death penalty
43
Notably, the
violated the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.
Court did not find that the death penalty constituted a per se violation
44
of the Eighth Amendment.
Issued as a per curiam opinion with each Justice writing separately,
Furman provides insight into the complicated and differing rationales
the majority relied upon in striking down the death penalty in 1972.
Some of the Justices, particularly Justices Douglas and Marshall,
found that the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the death penalty
45
was further tainted or exacerbated by racism and poverty. Justice
Stewart opined,
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously
selected random handful
upon whom the sentence of death has in
46
fact been imposed.

Further, Justice White observed,
I must arrive at judgment; and I can do no more than state a
conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
BANNER, supra note 5, at 214.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 240–57, 314–74.
Id. at 309–10 (footnotes omitted).
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and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state
criminal cases involving crimes for which death is the authorized
penalty. That conclusion, as I have said, is that the death penalty is
exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes
and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.
The short of it is that the policy of vesting sentencing authority
primarily in juries––a decision largely motivated by the desire to
mitigate the harshness of the law and to bring community judgment
to bear on the sentence as well as guilt or innocence––has so
effectively achieved its aims that capital punishment within the
confines of the47statutes now before us has for all practical purposes
run its course.

Furman rendered all death sentences across the country void and
struck down as unconstitutional all existing capital punishment
statutes. Even with states’ waning use of the death penalty, Furman
displayed sweeping use of federal judicial power over the sovereign
48
interests and prerogatives of states. Yet, if the statutes violated the
Eighth Amendment, if states imposed the death penalty in an arbitrary
or discriminatory manner, then it seems the basic and fundamental
49
duty of the Court to strike down such statutes.
Notwithstanding Justice White’s prediction that the death penalty
50
had “run its course,” shortly after Furman a number of state
legislatures revised their death penalty laws to address the objections
expressed by the Furman Court. Many of these states used the Model
Penal Code, a framework that the American Law Institute (ALI)
recently abandoned as unworkable, as a guide to rewrite their death
51
penalty statutes.
In the 1960s, section 210.5 of the Model Penal
47

Id. at 313.
Indeed one of the concerns of the dissenters in Furman was the sweeping use of
federal judicial power and the interference with state sovereign interests. Id. at 375–470.
49 This concept is as fundamental as judicial review under Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
50 Furman, 408 U.S. at 313.
51 The ALI drafts the Model Penal Code as well as other model statutes. The ALI sets
forth the following summary of its work and mission:
48

The American Law Institute is the leading independent organization in the
United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise
improve the law. The Institute (made up of 4000 lawyers, judges, and law
professors of the highest qualifications) drafts, discusses, revises, and publishes
Restatements of the Law, model statutes, and principles of law that are
enormously influential in the courts and legislatures, as well as in legal
scholarship and education. ALI has long been influential internationally and, in
recent years, more of its work has become international in scope.
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Code set out a death penalty sentencing statute that arguably created a
less arbitrary capital punishment system that included a separate
52
sentencing hearing before a jury or judge. Under this system, the
fact finder had to find the existence of an aggravating factor to make
the defendant eligible for the death penalty; only if the fact finder
found an aggravating factor could he consider the imposition of death.
In deciding whether to ultimately sentence an offender to death, the
fact finder also could consider mitigating factors warranting leniency.
While some post-Furman statutes used this formula or some variation
of it, other states experimented with alternative procedures
purportedly designed to address the concerns of Furman, including
mandatory death penalty systems. In all, thirty-five states and the
53
federal government enacted revised death penalty statutes.
In 1976, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
constitutionality of the revised death penalty statutes in five states:
54
55
56
57
58
Georgia, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and North Carolina.
The Court found the death penalty systems in Georgia, Florida, and
59
Texas constitutional, but struck down as unconstitutional the
60
mandatory death penalty systems in Louisiana and North Carolina.
In Furman, Justice White stated,
The imposition and execution of the death penalty are obviously
cruel in the dictionary sense. But the penalty has not been
considered cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense
because it was thought justified by the social ends it was deemed to
serve. At the moment that it ceases realistically to further these
purposes, however, the emerging question is whether its imposition
in such circumstances would violate the Eighth Amendment. It is
my view that it would, for its imposition would then be the pointless
and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to
AM. LAW INST., ALI OVERVIEW, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about
.overview (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
52 In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Court recognized a constitutional
requirement for jury sentencing in capital cases at least with respect to determining the
existence of aggravating factors that qualify a defendant for the death penalty.
53 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., PART I: HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty#reinst (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
54 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
55 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
56 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
57 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
58 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
59 Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Jurek, 428 U.S. 262.
60 Roberts, 428 U.S. 325; Woodson, 428 U.S. 280.
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any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with such
negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and
cruel
61
and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.

The Furman Court left unresolved the ultimate question of whether
62
the death penalty is per se a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
63
The statutes before the Court in Gregg v. Georgia forced the
Court to tackle this issue. In a plurality opinion authored by Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, the Court recognized the long history of
64
capital punishment in the United States as well as the legislative
65
response to Furman. The Court further expressed the belief that the
66
death penalty could deter certain offenses
and/or serve as
67
appropriate retribution for the offender’s crime. Because the Court
accepted the view that the death penalty advanced the legitimate penal
goals of retribution and/or deterrence, the Court found that the death
penalty itself did not offend the evolving standards of decency that
68
mark the progress of a maturing society. This finding opened the
door to the modern death penalty system by allowing states the
freedom to experiment with different death penalty processes,
provided that those processes did not otherwise violate the
Constitution.
The Court then turned to the revised death penalty systems to
determine whether the new procedures established by the states were
constitutional. In Furman, the Court found that the old sentencing
systems, which allowed unguided jury discretion in imposing death
sentences, created an arbitrary, capricious, random process that could
69
not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Louisiana
and North
70
Carolina responded to that constitutional concern by establishing a
mandatory death penalty system. The Court held, however, that while
the death penalty system in Furman violated the Constitution because
the system allowed too much discretion, the mandatory death penalty
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168–69.
428 U.S. 153.
Id. at 169–79.
Id. at 179–81.
Id. at 183, 186–87.
Id. at 183–86.
Id. at 187.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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systems of Louisiana and North Carolina violated Constitution
71
because those systems allowed no discretion. In an oft-quoted part
of its decision in Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court stated,
This conclusion [that mandatory death sentences are
unconstitutional] rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of
death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only
a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination
that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
72
case.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that while the jury could not have
unfettered discretion to choose life or death, the jury had to have
some discretion to impose a sentence less than death in a capital case
to assure that death was the appropriate punishment as to that
particular defendant and his or her crime.
The Court, however, upheld the capital punishment systems of
73
74
75
Georgia, Florida, and Texas.
While these systems allowed, to
varying degrees, some jury discretion, the systems also arguably
provided juries guidance in the imposition of the death penalty.
These systems set up processes whereby a jury had to find the
existence of certain aggravating factors in order to qualify a case as
egregious enough that the death penalty might be an appropriate
76
sentence.
Moreover, the systems provided the jury discretion to
impose a sentence of less than death usually based upon consideration
77
of mitigating factors that would warrant leniency.

71

Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331–36; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302–03.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
73 Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
74 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
75 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
76 See Jurek, 428 U.S. 262; Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Gregg, 428 U.S. 153. Of note, Texas
had the jury answer questions about the defendant’s future dangerousness and the nature of
the crime to narrow the class of offenders. In his dissent in Roberts, Justice White found
the Louisiana mandatory death penalty statute constitutionally indistinguishable from the
Texas statute approved by the Court in Jurek. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 359–60 (White, J.,
dissenting). In subsequent years, the Supreme Court found constitutional concerns with
the Texas death penalty system as well as the ability of a defendant to present mitigating
evidence and the jury’s ability to give effect to that evidence. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas,
543 U.S. 37 (2004) (per curiam); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 429 U.S. 302 (1989).
77 See Jurek, 428 U.S. 262; Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
72
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These cases––Furman in 1972 and Gregg and the four companion
cases from 1976––form the constitutional framework of the modern
death penalty system in the United States. In essence, to the extent
that the death penalty carries out the legitimate goals of retribution
78
and deterrence, it is not per se unconstitutional. Further, the Court
permits states to experiment with different death penalty processes.
The Court tolerates states’ experimentation with the death penalty,
provided that states (1) give juries some criteria––usually in the form
of aggravating factors––to determine whether the defendant is eligible
for the death penalty, and (2) allow juries the opportunity to consider
mitigating evidence and to perform individualized sentencing to
impose a sentence less than death, if warranted.
It is worth observing that there was a change in personnel in the
four years between Furman and Gregg––Justice John Paul Stevens
replaced Justice William O. Douglas. Notably, Justice Douglas voted
to strike down the death penalty statutes in Furman whereas Justice
79
Stevens voted to uphold the death penalty in Gregg. It is unlikely,
however, that this simple change in personnel alone accounts for the
upholding of the new death penalty statutes. Indeed, only two
Justices––Justices Marshall and Brennan––would have struck down
all of the revised death penalty statutes in 1976. Justices Stewart and
White, who joined the majority in Furman, voted to uphold the death
penalty systems in Georgia, Florida, and Texas.
Perhaps the new systems were appreciably better and adequately
eliminated arbitrariness and randomness in the death penalty process.
Whether the systems were better or not, however, was not readily
apparent in 1976. The new death penalty statutes were an experiment
to see whether, in practice, these systems could provide a rational and
constitutional method of allowing the death penalty to be exacted on
the worst of the worst. By a number of accounts, the experiment has
failed. By 2009, the ALI, which drafted the Model Penal Code death
penalty provision that served as the basis for many of the modern
death penalty statutes, forcefully disavowed its model death penalty

78 Interestingly, Justices Blackmun and Stevens, who both voted to uphold the death
penalty systems in Georgia, Florida, and Texas, subsequently questioned or wholly
abandoned America’s experiment with death. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 71–87
(2008) (Stevens, J., concurring); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143–59 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
79 But see Justice Stevens’s more recent discussion of the modern death penalty. Baze,
553 U.S. at 71–87 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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statute. In 2008, Justice Stevens, one of the authors of the plurality
opinion in Gregg, observed in a concurring opinion,
In sum, just as Justice White ultimately based his conclusion in
Furman on his extensive exposure to countless cases for which
death is the authorized penalty, I have relied on my own experience
in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty
represents “the pointless and needless extinction of life with only
marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.
A penalty with such negligible returns to the State [is] patently
excessive and 81
cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth
Amendment.”

Likewise, Justice Blackmun, who dissented in Furman and voted to
uphold the death penalty in 1976, concluded in 1994:
Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the death
penalty must be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or
not at all, . . . and, despite the effort of the States and courts to
devise legal formulas and procedural rules to meet this daunting
challenge, the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness,
discrimination, caprice, and mistake. This is not to say that the
problems with the death penalty today are identical to those that
were present 20 years ago. Rather, the problems that were pursued
down one hole with procedural rules and verbal formulas have
come to the surface somewhere else, just as virulent and pernicious
as they were in their original form. Experience has taught us that
the constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrariness and
discrimination from the administration of death . . . can never be
achieved without compromising an equally essential
component of
82
fundamental fairness––individualized sentencing.

It is possible also that the Court’s constitutional sanctioning of the
new statutes reflected the Court’s willingness and desire to protect
states’ prerogatives in the structure of their criminal justice systems.
Yet, a majority of the Court struck down mandatory death penalty
statutes that a number of the states enacted in reaction to Furman.
Thus, the decisions in Woodson and Roberts reflect the recognition
that the Court asserts constitutional norms even at the expense of state
83
sovereign interests.
80

See infra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
Baze, 553 U.S. at 86 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White,
J., concurring)).
82 Callins, 510 U.S. at 1143–44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(citations omitted).
83 Certainly this observation is true in a number of contexts outside of the death penalty.
For a contemporary example, see, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
81
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While there are important legal and constitutional distinctions
between the statutes at issue in Furman and the statutes at issue in
Gregg, changes and developments in the law do not happen in a
vacuum, and many factors influence court decisions and judicial
development of the law. In this regard it is important to recognize the
legislative and public backlash to Furman that occurred across the
84
country.
Although some Justices thought that Furman would end
capital punishment in the United States, thirty-five state legislatures
made clear their decisions to retain the death penalty as a sentencing
option.
Moreover, during this period of time, the United States experienced
a rather dramatic shift in social views and policy on imprisonment
and punishment generally. According to some scholars, from the
1920s to 1970s, the dominant, albeit not always consistent, view of
85
prison and criminal justice was a rehabilitation model. But in the
86
1970s this view changed, and changed rather dramatically. By the
mid-1970s, there was a growing dissatisfaction with the rehabilitation
model of prisons and criminal justice and increased academic
87
criticism about the efficacy of the rehabilitation model of prisons.
At the same time, crime rates rose and there were mounting public
concerns about crime, social unrest, and the dramatic social change at
88
play in the country during this period. By the end of the 1970s, the
goals of rehabilitation were no longer the primary purpose of

84 A number of articles have discussed the backlash to Furman, including Amanda
Frost, Defending the Majoritarian Court, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757 (2010); Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17 (2009); Corinna Barrett
Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 46–55 (2007); Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Consideration Transforms an
Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117 (2010).
85 Craig Haney, Counting Casualties in the War on Prisoners, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 87,
92–98 (2008).
86 Id. at 98–101.
87 Id.
88 For a general history of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States see MARK
KURLANSKY, 1968: THE YEAR THAT ROCKED THE WORLD (Ballantine Books 2004);
JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1996); James T. Patterson, RESTLESS GIANT: THE UNITED STATES FROM
WATERGATE TO BUSH V. GORE (2005); see also Vanessa Barker, Explaining the Great
American Crime Decline: A Review of Blumstein and Wallman, Goldberger and
Rosenfeld, and Zimring, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 489, 493–95 (2010) (book review); Ric
Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE
L.J. 843, 850–51 (2010).
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incarceration; rather, arguably more punitive or retributive goals
89
emerged as the dominant purposes of prisons and incarceration.
Some commentators have speculated that, in part, the shift from
Furman to Gregg reflects the Court’s reaction to the political and
90
social backlash seen in the wake of the Furman decision. Likewise,
the decision may mirror the changing political climate of the mid1970s, in particular the changing climate regarding prisons and
punishment in general. Further, this shift may indicate the Court’s
concern over the appropriateness of the Court’s depriving states of the
ability to experiment with death penalty schemes. Regardless of the
various motivations and justifications behind Gregg and its
companion cases, these cases ushered in the modern death penalty in
the United States.
III
AFTERMATH OF GREGG
After Gregg, the country seemed to engage in a full-throttled
acceleration of capital punishment and executions. In 1999 alone,
91
states executed ninety-eight condemned prisoners, and the country
experienced one of the highest rates of executions in the twentieth
92
century. In 2009, the United States ranked fourth in the world in the
number of people executed, exceeded only by China, Iraq, and Saudi
93
Arabia.
Support for the death penalty in the last decades of the
94
twentieth century emerged as a “can’t lose” political tool. During

89

Haney, supra note 85, at 98–101.
See, e.g., Frost, supra note 84; Hills, supra note 84; Lain, supra note 84, at 46–55.
91 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
92 BANNER, supra note 5, at 303.
93 AMNESTY INT’L, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2009, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death
-penalty/death-sentences-and-executions-in-2009 (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
94 See Cathleen Burnett, The Failed Failsafe: The Politics of Executive Clemency, 8
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 191, 194 (2003) (“Support for the death penalty became part of
conventional political wisdom while the voices for abolition were rendered impotent.
Since Michael Dukakis’s defeat in 1988, attributed in part of his opposition to the death
penalty, presidential candidates of both major political parties have all unequivocally
supported the death penalty.”); Corinna Barrett Lain, The Doctrinal Side of Majority Will,
2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 775, 791–92 n.81 (2010) (observing that during the 1980s,
politicians successfully campaigned on platforms of more executions faster); William W.
Wilkins, The Legal, Political, and Social Implications of the Death Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L.
REV. 793, 803 (2007) (“To put it briefly, the death penalty is a political minefield. In
many states, including South Carolina, most political analysts agree that it is virtually
90
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his first run for the presidency, then-Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton
oversaw the execution of Ricky Ray Rector, a mentally disabled man
95
This stance on execution contrasted
on Arkansas’s death row.
sharply with the stance of 1988 Democratic presidential candidate
Michael Dukasis, whom pundits derided and the public punished for
96
his opposition to the death penalty.
The execution of Rector
demonstrated that Clinton, a Democrat, was not “soft on crime” or
97
soft on the death penalty.
This political backlash against those who opposed, or even
expressed reservations about, the death penalty extended to the
98
judicial branches of state and federal governments. In a number of
states, both trial and appellate judges are elected to their positions or
subject to retention ballots. This electoral process raises the specter
99
of politicization of the judicial branch.
In 1996, Tennessee
Supreme Court Justice Penny White lost her seat on that state’s high
court primarily because of a concurring vote in a death penalty
100
case.
Likewise, Chief Justice Rose Bird and two associate justices
lost their seats on the California Supreme Court because of opinions
101
critical of capital punishment.

impossible to be a successful candidate for statewide public office without being in favor
of capital punishment, lest one be painted as ‘soft on crime’ by an opponent.”).
95 Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283,
317–18 (2008) (“Determined not to repeat the mistake of the preceding Democratic
nominee for President, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, of opposing the death
penalty, Clinton suspended campaigning on the eve of the 1992 New Hampshire
Democratic primary to return to Arkansas to preside over an execution. The condemned
man was ‘a brain-damaged, African-American’ who had saved part of his last meal
‘thinking that he was going to come back and eat it after the execution.’”).
96 See Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 36–37 (2007); Leland
Ware & David C. Wilson, Jim Crow on the “Down Low”: Subtle Racial Appeals in
Presidential Campaigns, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 299, 313 (2009); see also
Alan Rogers, The Death Penalty and Reversible Error in Massachusetts, 6 PIERCE L. REV.
515, 530 (2008).
97 Smith, supra note 95, at 318.
98 See Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the South?
Overcoming History, Elections, and Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 817 (1998).
99 Id. at 845.
100 See Kenneth J. Aulet, It’s Not Who Hires You but Who Can Fire You: The Case
Against Retention Elections, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 589, 606 (2011); Paul D.
Carrington, Public Funding of Judicial Campaigns: The North Carolina Experience and
the Activism of the Supreme Court, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1965, 1990 (2011).
101 See id.
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But the dawning of the twenty-first century began an important
shift in America’s experiment with the modern death penalty.
Evidence suggests increasing acceptance of and appreciation for
Justice Stevens’s observation that
current decisions by state legislatures, by the Congress of the
United States, and by this Court to retain the death penalty as a part
of our law are the product of habit and inattention rather than an
acceptable deliberative process that weighs the costs and risks of
administering that penalty against its identifiable benefits, and rest
in part on a faulty
assumption about the retributive force of the
102
death penalty.

Further, as noted above, the ALI abandoned its model statute for
103
capital punishment in October 2009.
In reaching this decision, the
ALI Council overwhelmingly concluded “in light of the current
intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensuring a
104
minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment,”
a model death penalty should not be offered. The ALI found that its
model death penalty statute had “not withstood the tests of time and
105
experience.”
Among the concerns expressed by the ALI were the
following:
(a) the tension between clear statutory identification of which
murders should command the death penalty and the constitutional
requirement of individualized determination; (b) the difficulty of
limiting the list of aggravating factors so that they do not cover (as
they do in a number of state statutes now) a large percentage of
murderers; (c) the near impossibility of addressing by legal rule the
conscious or unconscious racial bias within the criminal-justice
system that has resulted in statistical disparity in death sentences
based on the race of the victim; (d) the enormous economic costs of
administering a death-penalty regime, combined with studies
showing that the legal representation provided to some criminal
defendants is inadequate; (e) the likelihood, especially given the
availability and reliability of DNA testing, that some persons
sentenced to death will later, and perhaps too late, be shown to not
have committed the crime for which they were sentenced; and (f)
the politicization of judicial elections, where––even though nearly
all state judges perform their tasks conscientiously––candidate

102

Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
AM. LAW INST., REPORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE ON THE MATTER OF THE DEATH PENALTY 4 (2009); Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, No More Tinkering: The American Law Institute and the Death Penalty
Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 89 TEX. L. REV. 353 (2010).
104 AM. LAW INST., supra note 103, at annex B, at 1.
105 Id. at 4.
103
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statements of personal views on the death penalty and incumbent
106
judges’ actions in death-penalty cases become campaign issues.

The ALI now rejects the very model that served as the basis for the
107
constitutionally approved modern death penalty statutes.
Further, in 2002 and 2005, the Court restricted states’ prerogatives
in structuring their capital sentencing regimes by forbidding the
108
imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders and
109
By finding that there are classes of individuals
juvenile offenders.
who, as a group, are not sufficiently culpable for their actions to be
subjected to death, the Court signaled that the Eighth Amendment
confines the imposition of the death penalty and that states do not
have unfettered discretion as to whom and when they may kill. In
significant part, the Court’s decision to exempt juveniles and mentally
retarded offenders from the death penalty resulted from the fact that a
significant number of states had legislatively prohibited the
110
imposition of the death penalty on these two vulnerable groups.
In
Atkins and Roper, eighteen death penalty states and twelve non-deathpenalty states prohibited the death penalty against mentally retarded
offenders and juvenile offenders. When legislative death-penalty
restrictions reach this critical mass, the Court has indicated that it will
find sufficient evidence of a national consensus that the nation has
turned its face on the use of the death penalty in this manner and that
evolving standards of decency preclude the use of the death penalty
111
under these circumstances.
112
Likewise, in Kennedy v. Louisiana,
the Court held that a
Louisiana statute that provided the death penalty for the crime of rape
of a young child was unconstitutional. In reaching its decision, the
Court made clear that the death penalty is limited to the worst of the
113
Accordingly, the
worst, the most egregious crimes and offenders.
106

Id. at 5.
Id. at 3–4.
108 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319–21 (2002). In 1989, the Court upheld the
imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated in part by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
109 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). In 1989, the Court upheld the
imposition of the death penalty on sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
110 Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
111 Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
112 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
113 Id. at 420.
107
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Court found that the death penalty is an excessive punishment for
114
Again, a
ordinary crimes in which the victim is not murdered.
substantial part of the Court’s evolving standards of decency analysis
relied on state legislation and the fact that only six states had the
115
penalty of death for child rape.
Although, in all of these cases, the Court asserts that ultimately its
judgment on the excessiveness and/or proportionality of the
punishment controls the constitutional standard, strong evidence
exists suggesting that state legislative action may push the Court
116
forward or backward in its Eighth Amendment analysis.
Indeed, it
appears that the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis depends, at least
117
in part and maybe in critical part, on what state legislatures do.
IV
LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
In a departure from the early enthusiasm for post-Gregg death
sentences, over the last decade, states have questioned and examined
their death penalty statutes. For example, some states, including
118
119
120
121
California,
Connecticut,
Illinois,
Indiana,
and New
122
Jersey, created commissions to study the fairness, efficiency, costeffectiveness, and appropriateness of the death penalty. Certain
consistent concerns or themes emerge in these reports, including the
high economic cost of capital punishment, the quality of defense
counsel, the potential racial disparity in the capital sentencing
process, and the danger of executing an innocent person. Kansas,
which reinstated the death penalty in 1994, issued a post-audit report
114

Id. at 421.
Id. at 422–26.
116 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407; Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
117 See generally Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407; Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304;
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
118 CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA (2008).
119 STATE OF CONN. COMM’N ON THE DEATH PENALTY, STUDY PURSUANT TO PUBLIC
ACT NO. 01-151 OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CONNECTICUT (2003).
120 ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002).
121 IND. CRIMINAL LAW STUDY COMM’N, THE APPLICATION OF INDIANA’S CAPITAL
SENTENCING LAW: FINDINGS OF THE INDIANA CRIMINAL LAW STUDY COMMISSION
(2002).
122 N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY
COMMISSION REPORT (2007).
115
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in late 2003 concluding that the capital cases cost approximately
123
States have reacted to
seventy percent more than noncapital cases.
reports about the failures of the death penalty by legislative
limitations, judicial and executive decisions not to act on death
penalty statutes, and legislative abolition.
Some states implemented statutory changes to deal with the
fairness and efficacy problems of capital punishment. For example,
North Carolina implemented the Racial Justice Act, which provides a
greater opportunity for an offender to raise challenges based on racial
124
bias in capital prosecutions.
Maryland dramatically restricted the
death penalty and placed higher evidentiary burdens in cases where
125
the state seeks death.
Likewise, judges have expressed misgivings about the death
penalty. For example, Judge Boyce Martin of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated,
Now in my thirtieth year as a judge on this Court, I have had an
inside view of our system of capital punishment almost since the
death penalty was reintroduced in the wake of Furman v. Georgia.
During that time, judges, lawyers, and elected officials have
expended great time and resources attempting to ensure the fairness,
proportionality, and accuracy that the Constitution demands of our
system. But those efforts have utterly failed. Capital punishment in
this country remains “arbitrary, biased, and so fundamentally
flawed at its very core that it is beyond repair.” At the same time,
the system’s necessary emphasis on competent representation,
123 LEGISLATIVE DIV. OF POST AUDIT, STATE OF KAN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT:
COSTS INCURRED FOR DEATH PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS 10–19 (2003). Studies and audits of other states’ capital punishment
systems confirm that the cost of a capital trial and appeals greatly exceeds costs incurred in
noncapital trials. See PHILIP COOK & DONNA SLAWSON, TERRY SANFORD INST. OF PUB.
POLICY DUKE UNIV., THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA
(1993); JOHN G. MORGAN, STATE OF TENN., TENNESSEE’S DEATH PENALTY: COSTS AND
CONSEQUENCES (2004); JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST. JUDICIAL POLICY CTR., THE
COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND (2008).
124 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2010 to -2012 (2009); Seth Kotch & Robert P.
Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty
in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031 (2010). In late 2011, the North Carolina
legislature voted to repeal the Racial Justice Act, but North Carolina Governor Bev
Perdue, a death penalty supporter, vetoed the repeal effort stating, “[I]t is simply
unacceptable for racial prejudice to play a role in the imposition of the death penalty in
North Carolina.” Gary D. Robertson, Beverly Perdue, North Carolina Governor, Vetoes
Repeal of Racial Justice Act, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/14/racial-justice-act-bev-perdue-death-penalty-north
-carolina_n_1148776.html.
125 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (West 2009).
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sound trial procedure, and searching post-conviction
review has
126
made it exceedingly expensive to maintain.

In September 2011, Chief Justice O’Connor of the Ohio Supreme
Court convened a committee to review that state’s death penalty,
although the purpose of the committee is not to debate whether Ohio
127
should retain capital punishment.
The New York Court of Appeals found that the New York death
penalty statute, which New York enacted in 1995, included a jury
deadlock instruction that violated article I, section 6 of New York’s
128
state constitution.
In particular, the New York Court of Appeals
concluded that the deadlock instruction might coerce jurors to impose
129
Recognizing that the New York Constitution
a death sentence.
provided greater due process protection than the federal constitution
and concluding that U.S. Supreme Court precedent offered less
protection than due process deserved, the New York Court of Appeals
struck down the deadlock instruction in the New York death penalty
130
statute.
Because the deadlock instruction was a critical part of the
New York statute, this decision rendered the capital sentencing statute
invalid unless and until the state legislature amended the statute to
131
cure the defect.
The New York legislature did not reinstate the
132
death penalty.
On November 22, 2011, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber declared
a moratorium on executions in that state through the duration of his
133
term in office.
Oregon reinstated the death penalty in 1984, and
during his previous terms as governor from 1995 to 2003, Kitzhaber
134
oversaw the only two modern executions carried out in the state.
Returning to the governor’s office for his third term, Governor
126 Wiles v. Bagley, 561 F.3d 636, 642 (6th Cir. 2009) (Boyce, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
127 Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ohio’s Top Judge Calls for Death Penalty Review,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 8, 2011).
128 People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004).
129 Id. at 356–59.
130 Id. at 364–65.
131 Id. at 365–67; see People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 970 (N.Y. 2007).
132 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 103, at 363; Michael Powell, In N.Y., Lawmakers Vote
Not to Reinstate Capital Punishment, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2005, at A3.
133 Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Kitzhaber Issues Reprieve––Calls
for Action on Capital Punishment (2011), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
/gov-john-kitzhaber-oregon-declares-moratorium-all-executions.
134 Id.; William Yardley, Oregon Governor Says He Will Block Executions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, at A14.
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Kitzhaber, a Democrat who is opposed to the death penalty, refused to
135
In explaining his reasons for the
oversee a third execution.
moratorium, Governor Kitzhaber stated,
Oregonians have a fundamental belief in fairness and justice––in
swift and certain justice. The death penalty as practiced in Oregon
is neither fair nor just; and it is not swift or certain. It is not applied
equally to all. It is a perversion of justice that the single best
indicator of who will and will not be executed has nothing to do
with the circumstances of a crime or the findings of a jury. The
only factor that determines whether someone sentenced to death in
Oregon is actually executed is that they volunteer. The hard truth is
that in the 27 years since Oregonians reinstated the death penalty, it
has only been carried out on two volunteers who waived their rights
to appeal.
In the years since those executions, many judges, district attorneys,
legislators, death penalty proponents and opponents, and victims
and their families have agreed that Oregon’s system is broken.
But we have done nothing. We have avoided the question.
And during that time, a growing number of states have reconsidered
their approach to capital punishment given public concern, evidence
of wrongful convictions, the unequal application of the law, the
expense of the process and other issues.136

Governor Kitzhaber also set out more personal reasons for the
moratorium:
[The death penalty] has been carried out just twice in [the] last 49
years in Oregon. Both were during my first administration as
Governor, one in 1996 and the other in 1997. I allowed those
sentences to be carried out despite my personal opposition to the
death penalty. I was torn between my personal convictions about
the morality of capital punishment and my oath to uphold the
Oregon constitution.
They were the most agonizing and difficult decisions I have made
as Governor and I have revisited and questioned them over and over
again during the past 14 years. I do not believe that those
executions made us safer; and certainly they did not make us nobler
as a society. And I simply cannot participate once again in
something I believe to be morally wrong.137

135
136
137

Yardley, supra note 134.
Press Release, supra note 133.
Id.
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Governor Kitzhaber called for the Oregon legislature to consider
reforms to the death penalty and urged the people of Oregon to
138
“engage in the long overdue debate” on the death penalty.
139
In the last four years, three state legislatures––New Mexico,
140
141
and Illinois ––have abolished the death penalty
New Jersey,
outright. These legislative acts are a remarkable departure from the
trend of the first thirty years after Gregg and may prove informative
for the debates that are bound to arise in Oregon as well as in other
states revisiting the death penalty. In looking at the changes in
legislative responses to the death penalty, it is worth considering the
142
experiences of New Mexico, New Jersey, and Illinois.
A. New Mexico Legislative Abolition of Capital Punishment
As noted earlier, in the years following Gregg, states and
politicians eagerly embraced capital punishment, making it a
prominent and seemingly intractable part of the criminal justice
system. New Mexico offers an interesting study of how this status
changed and how the legislative process can result in abolition of the
death penalty.
Prior to Furman, the death penalty statute in New Mexico
provided,
When a defendant has been convicted of a capital felony the judge
shall sentence that person to death, unless the jury trying the case
shall recommend life imprisonment, the judge shall sentence that
person to life imprisonment; provided that in cases wherein the
defendant has entered a plea of guilty to the commission of a capital
felony, the court may in lieu of sentencing such person to death,
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.143

Like other pre-Furman death penalty statutes, the New Mexico statute
allowed the jury discretion to impose a sentence less than death, but
144
did not provide criteria to guide the jury in this process.
In 1969,
138

Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14 (West 2009).
140 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2007).
141 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/119-1 (West 2011).
142 For a discussion of the history of the death penalty in New Mexico, see Marcia J.
Wilson, The Application of the Death Penalty in New Mexico, July 1979 Through
December 2007: An Empirical Analysis, 38 N.M. L. REV. 255 (2008).
143 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2 (1963).
144 See State v. Pace, 456 P.2d 197, 204–05 (N.M. 1969) (finding that the pre-Furman
death penalty statute did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
139

ENTZEROTH

2012]

3/19/2012 1:59 PM

The End of the Beginning: The Politics of Death and the American
Death Penalty Regime in the Twenty-First Century

821

perhaps reflecting the national anti-death-penalty trend of the years
immediately preceding Furman, the New Mexico legislature limited
the death penalty to the following offenses:
Punishment by death for any crime is abolished except for the crime
of killing a police officer or prison or jail guard while in the
performance of his duties and except if the jury recommends the
death penalty when the defendant commits a second capital felony
after the time 145
for due deliberation following the commission of a
capital felony.

The same sentencing process of undirected jury discretion continued
to apply to this more limited range of capital offenses. Furman,
however, rendered this death penalty system in New Mexico
unconstitutional because the sentencing statute allowed juries
unguided discretion in imposing a sentence less than death, which
146
was the practice that Furman condemned.
Like some other states, New Mexico responded to Furman by
creating a new death penalty statute that provided, “When a defendant
has been convicted of a capital felony, he shall be punished by
147
death.”
New Mexico, thus, removed the jury’s sentencing
discretion that rendered its previous statutes unconstitutional under
Furman. As noted earlier, however, in 1976, the Supreme Court in
Woodson v. North Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana concluded that
such mandatory death penalty statutes violated the Eighth
148
Amendment.
In particular, the Court noted that “by the end of
World War I, all but eight States, Hawaii, and the District of
Columbia either had adopted discretionary death penalty schemes or
abolished the death penalty altogether. By 1963, all of these
remaining jurisdictions had replaced their automatic death penalty
149
statutes with discretionary jury sentencing.”
The Court concluded
that the pre-Furman legislative rejection of mandatory death penalty
statutes evidenced that states had found that mandatory death
150
sentences were “unduly harsh and unworkably rigid.”
Although
145 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2.1 (1963) (repealed 1973). Section 40A-29-2.3 further
provided that “[a]ny person currently under the penalty of death shall have such penalty
revoked, a penalty of life imprisonment substituted.” See Pace, 456 P.2d at 205 (applying
the statute retroactively to a case pending on direct appeal).
146 See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
147 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2.1 (1973).
148 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
149 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291–92 (1976) (footnote omitted).
150 Id. at 293.
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the Court recognized that some states had enacted mandatory death
penalty statutes in the wake of Furman, it nonetheless found that such
151
statutes ran afoul of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
This determination rendered the New Mexico’s first post-Furman
statute invalid.
The New Mexico legislature responded to Woodson by crafting a
statute that captured the elements that the Court sanctioned in Gregg
v. Georgia. Specifically, section 31-18-14 of the New Mexico Code
provided,
When a defendant has been convicted of a capital felony, he shall
be punished by life imprisonment or death. The punishment shall
be imposed after a sentencing hearing separate from the trial or
guilty plea proceeding. However, if the defendant has not reached
the age of majority at the time of the commission of the capital
felony for which he was convicted, he may be152
sentenced to life
imprisonment but shall not be punished by death.

Capital felonies were broader than the death-eligible felonies
153
specified by the legislature in 1969.
In the post-Gregg system,
capital felonies were no longer as limited as they were pre-Furman,
but rather section 30-2-1 provided,
A. Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by
another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means
with which death may be caused:
(1) by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing;
(2) in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony; or
(3) by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a
depraved mind regardless of human life.
Whoever commits murder in the first degree is guilty of a capital
felony.

Thus, more offenders were eligible for a death sentence under the
post-Gregg statutes than were eligible for the death sentence in the
years immediately preceding Furman.
Nonetheless, while New Mexico adopted new and even broader
death penalty statutes after Furman and Gregg, New Mexico did not
151

Id. at 305.
The New Mexico Legislature repealed section 31-18-14 in 2009 replacing it with the
following language: “When a defendant has been convicted of a capital felony, the
defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or life imprisonment without possibility
of release or parole.”
153 See supra notes 143–45.
152
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display the unbridled enthusiasm for the death penalty that could be
found in other states such as Texas or Arizona. For example, New
Mexico was one of the first states to forbid the execution of juvenile
154
offenders.
In addition to its early decision to create this categorical
limitation on the death penalty, New Mexico never accumulated a
155
From 1997 to 2007, New Mexico
large death row population.
156
sentenced fifteen men to death and executed only one condemned
157
Evidently, Clark instructed his lawyers to
prisoner, Terry Clark.
158
By contrast,
drop his appeal and allow the state to execute him.
since reinstating the death penalty after Furman, neighboring state
Arizona has executed twenty-eight people and currently has 134
159
condemned prisoners on death row; Texas has executed 477 people
160
and currently has 321 individuals on death row.
Another example of New Mexico’s ambivalence about the death
penalty occurred in 1986 when Governor Toney Anaya commuted the
death sentences of all five condemned prisoners who occupied New
161
Mexico’s death row at that time.
Governor Anaya opposed capital
162
punishment and stated his position prior to his election.
His
position on the death penalty and its commutations starkly contrasts
the position of most politicians, who readily embraced the death
163
penalty in the 1980s.
These commutations represent an executive
abolition effort, at least with respect to those already sentenced to
154 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., NEW MEXICO: GENERAL INFORMATION, http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-mexico-1 (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
155 See Wilson, supra note 142, at 266.
156 Id.
157 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE DATABASE: NEW MEXICO,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
The
condemned prisoner, Terry Clark, died by lethal injection in 2001. Wilson, supra note
142, at 271. It was the first execution in New Mexico since 1960. Id.
158 See Wilson, supra note 142, at 271.
159 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE DATABASE: ARIZONA, http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
160 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE DATABASE: TEXAS, http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
161 See Richard E. Meyer, Governor Calls Practice ‘Anti-God’: Anaya Spares All
Inmates on New Mexico Death Row, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1986, at 1; Dave Maass,
Former New Mexico Governor, Toney Anaya, Talks Death Penalty Politics, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 25, 2009, 5:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dave-maass/former-new
-mexico-governo_b_298557.html.
162 Maass, supra note 161.
163 Id.
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death, as opposed to abolition by the legislative or judicial branches
of government. Such executive commutations play another vital role
in the evolution of the death penalty and the development of the
164
Eighth Amendment’s evolving standards of decency.
The recent
moratorium by Oregon Governor Kitzhaber may play a similar role in
that state’s death penalty evolution.
In 2009, New Mexico took the final step toward abolition. With
165
the New Mexico legislature
only two prisoners on death row,
passed a bill abolishing the death penalty. On March 18, 2009,
Governor Bill Richardson, a Democrat and death penalty
166
167
supporter, signed the abolition bill into law.
In signing the bill,
Richardson stated,
This has been the most difficult decision of my political career. . . .
I do not have confidence in the criminal justice system as it
currently operates to be the final arbiter when it comes to who lives
and who dies for their crime. . . . If the State is going to undertake
this awesome responsibility, the system to impose this ultimate
penalty must be perfect and can never be wrong.168

The two prisoners on New Mexico’s death row at that time, however,
did not receive a reprieve from their death sentences since the state
164 A more recent and limited example of executive commutation occurred in Ohio. On
September 28, 2011, Ohio Governor John Kasich granted clemency to Joseph Murphy.
This was Gov. Kasich’s second commutation since he took office in January 2011.
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., CLEMENCY: OHIO DEATH ROW INMATE GRANTED
CLEMENCY, CITING ‘BRUTALLY ABUSIVE UPBRINGING,’ http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
/clemency-ohio-death-row-inmate-granted-clemency-citing-brutally-abusive-upbringing
(last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
165 STATE BY STATE DATABASE: NEW MEXICO, supra note 157.
166 Interestingly, Lieutenant Governor Diane D. Denish, a Democrat, supported the
repeal of the death penalty, and she expressed her views to Governor Richardson. Trip
Jennings, Richardson Abolishes N.M. Death Penalty, N.M. INDEPENDENT, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://newmexicoindependent.com/22487/guv-abolishes-death-penalty-in-nm. When the
repeal process began during the legislative session, it at first appeared that Governor
Richardson, a death penalty supporter, would be leaving the governor’s post for a position
in the Obama Administration and that Denish, a death penalty opponent, would fill the
post. Richardson did not take a position in the Obama administration, however, and stayed
on as New Mexico’s governor. See Felicity Barringer, In Santa Fe, Staying Can Also Be
Such Sweet Sorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, at A16; Brian Knowlton, Obama Names
Richardson as Commerce Secretary, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/12/04/us/politics/04transition.html; Andy Barr, Bill Richardson Tarnished by
Scandal, POLITICO, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/18741
.html.
167 Jennings, supra note 166; Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2009, at A16.
168 Id.
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did not extend its change in the death penalty law retroactively to
169
these individuals.
The abolition of the death penalty in New Mexico came about
through the democratic process: a slow, arduous labor that engaged
the efforts of many individuals. Among the many people involved in
the repeal process were Viki Elkey, who served as Executive Director
of the New Mexico Coalition to Repeal the Death Penalty during this
170
legislative effort,
and State Representative Gail Chasey, a
Democrat from Albuquerque, who first introduced a bill to abolish the
171
death penalty in 1999.
The New Mexico Coalition to Repeal the Death Penalty began its
abolition campaign in 1997 and underwent twelve years of successes
and setbacks until its ultimate triumph in 2009. Several themes
resonated throughout this process and perhaps proved helpful in the
172
Coalition’s ultimate success.
First, the Coalition linked the needs
of the murder victim’s family with the inadequacy of the death
penalty system.
Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation
supported the repeal of the death penalty, and surviving family
members testified that the death penalty did not remedy or bring
173
closure to their families.
In this regard, the legislation tied the
costs savings from abolishing the death penalty to services for
families of victims. Thus, rather than simply abandoning or
neglecting the interests and needs of the murder victims and their
families, the abolition efforts tied abolition to directly helping
victims’ families. In addition, the punishment of death was replaced
with life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which is a
harsh punishment that prevents the offender from returning to society.

169

See STATE BY STATE DATABASE: NEW MEXICO, supra note 157.
Viki Elkey, Abolishing the Death Penalty in New Mexico: Lessons Learned in a
Long Campaign, PEACEWORK, May 2009, available at http://www.peaceworkmagazine
.org/abolishing-death-penalty-new-mexico-lessons-learned-long-campaign. Elkey is a
remarkable, spirited, vivacious woman who appears to have taken on her abolition task
with utter determination and grit.
171 N.M. LEGISLATURE, BILLS SPONSORED BY: GAIL CHASEY, 1999 REGULAR
SESSION, http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/legdetails.aspx?SPONCODE=HCHAS (last visited
Jan. 16, 2012).
172 Interview with Viki Elkey, Exec. Dir. of the N.M. Coal. to Repeal the Death Penalty
(July 1, 2010).
173 Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., New Mexico’s Legislature Votes to Abolish
Death Penalty––Part of National Trend Away from Capital Punishment (Mar. 13, 2009).
170
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Second, a powerful component of the abolition process revolved
around the danger of executing an innocent person. As Elkey
explained, exonerated men and women changed the tone of debate
174
with personal stories.
The fear of New Mexico killing an innocent
person and the face of those innocent individuals who barely escaped
the executioner’s needle echoed throughout the death penalty
175
debate.
Among those telling stories of exoneration was Juan
Melendez, who had been convicted and sentenced to die in Florida,
and who spent eighteen years on death row before he was
176
exonerated.
Uneasiness over executing an innocent person has
become an important topic in the debate over the legitimacy of the
177
As Justice Souter observed in his concurring
death penalty.
opinion in Marsh v. Kansas, “Today, a new body of fact must be
accounted for in deciding what, in practical terms, the Eighth
Amendment guarantees should tolerate, for the period starting in 1989
has seen repeated exonerations of convicts under death sentences, in
178
numbers never imagined before the development of DNA tests.”
The faith community also played a critical role in advocating
abolition of the death penalty with officials from the Roman Catholic
179
Church lobbying hard for repeal.
Of note, Pope John Paul II issued
encyclical “Evangelium Vitae” (The Gospel of Life) on March 25,
1995, stating,
It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and
extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided
upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender
except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would
not be possible otherwise to defend society. Today however, as a
result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal
180
system, such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent.

174

Elkey, supra note 172.
Id.
176 Shari Allison & Cathy Ansheles, Taking Death off the Table in the Land of
Enchantment, CHAMPION, June 2009, at 42.
177 As noted in the Introduction, perhaps one of the most prominent recent examples of
this problem was the execution of Troy Davis. See, e.g., Editorial, A Grievous Wrong,
N.Y. TIMES Sept. 20, 2011, at A30; Kim Severson, Georgia Execution to Proceed; Bids to
Halt It Go On, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at A21.
178 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 207–08 (2006).
179 Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, supra note 167.
180 POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER, EVANGELIUM VITAE (THE GOSPEL OF
LIFE) ¶ 56 (1995).
175
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The Catholic Church, as well as other religious denominations,
181
presented moral pressure for abolition.
Third, cost proved a strong argument to abolish the death penalty.
In the fiscal impact report prepared in connection with the New
Mexico bill to abolish the death penalty, the Public Defender
182
Department claimed that abolition would save millions of dollars.
The State Bar Task Force on the Administration of the Death Penalty
also explained that the death penalty entails certain significant costs
183
not found in noncapital cases.
Elkey nonetheless advised that
184
although cost was an important issue, it was not determinative.
Instead, the death penalty debate evoked a more emotional, moral,
visceral decision-making process.
To that end, the religious
component, particularly in a state like New Mexico with a strong
Catholic community, and the very real risk of executing an innocent
person proved critical. Reflecting an evolving standard of decency, at
least by New Mexico standards, the risk of executing someone who is
innocent, particularly given the increasing evidence of this problem,
makes the death penalty unsustainable.
B. New Jersey Legislative Abolition of Capital Punishment
Two years before the legislative abolition of the death penalty in
New Mexico, the New Jersey legislature abolished the death penalty.
New Jersey enacted its modern death penalty statute in 1982 and
modeled the statute after the Model Penal Code although the
185
legislature subsequently amended the statute a number of times.
During the modern death penalty era, sixty individuals were
sentenced to death, fifty-two of those individuals had their sentences
186
reversed by the courts, and no one was executed.
The last
187
execution in New Jersey took place in 1963.
The abolition efforts in New Jersey came about as a result of a few
committed individuals, including Jack Callahan, Lorry W. Post, and

181

Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, supra note 167.
LEGISLATIVE FINANCE COMMITTEE FOR THE NEW MEXICO LEGISLATURE, FISCAL
IMPACT REPORT, H.B. 285, Regular Session, at 2 (2009).
183 Id.
184 Elkey, supra note 172.
185 N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, supra note 122, at 6, 8–10.
186 Id. at 7.
187 Id. at 5.
182
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Celeste Fitzgerald as well as the dedicated work of several state
188
New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium
legislators.
(NJDPM) spearheaded the lobbying effort, and its members, as well
as other organizations such as the NAACP and Amnesty
International, worked tirelessly to end the death penalty in New
189
Jersey.
In their lobbying and education efforts, these organizations
often highlighted the risk of executing an innocent person and the
failure of the death penalty to provide satisfaction to the victim’s
190
family.
Among the first successes for NJDPM was the establishment of a
commission to study the death penalty; the commission issued its
191
findings in January 2007.
In relevant part, the Commission
concluded the following: the death penalty served no legitimate
purpose, the death penalty was inconsistent with evolving standards
of decency, the death penalty cost more than life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole, a sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole adequately met public safety and
penal interests, and funds should be made available to families of
192
murder victims.
The Commission then recommended that New
Jersey abolish the death penalty and recommended that cost savings
from abolition be used for services for surviving family members of
193
murder victims.
After the issuance of the Commission report, the state legislature
194
took up the charge during a lame duck session.
Senators Raymond
Lesniak and Robert Martin and House Speaker Joseph Roberts played
critical roles in pushing the abolition legislation through the state
legislature. While the New Jerseyans for an Alternative to the Death
Penalty and other organizations lobbied extensively for repeal, vocal
195
opposition argued against it.
The battle for repeal in the state

188 See Robert J. Martin, Killing Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The First State in
Modern History to Repeal Its Death Penalty Statute, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 485, 497–98
(2010) (providing a detailed and firsthand account of the repeal of capital punishment in
New Jersey).
189 Id. at 497–501.
190 Id. at 502.
191 Id. at 499; N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, supra note 122.
192 N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, supra note 122, at 21–65.
193 Id. at 67.
194 Martin, supra note 188, at 540.
195 Id. at 526–27.
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196

legislature was heated, contentious, and dramatic.
Like in New
Mexico, abolitionist arguments that proved effective included the risk
of executing an innocent person, the cost savings achieved by
abolishing the death penalty and replacing it with it with a sentence of
life without the possibility of parole, and the benefits of tying the
savings earned from abolishing capital punishment to services for
197
family members of murder victims.
In addition, given that New
Jersey had not executed anyone since the early 1960s, some argued
that sentencing individuals to death was a fraud since no one was
198
executed after the state reinstated the death penalty in 1982.
Opposing repeal of the death penalty, several victims’ family
members spoke passionately about the need to retain the death penalty
to vindicate the victims’ deaths and argued for effective enforcement
199
of the capital punishment statute rather than abandoning it.
Ultimately, the abolition legislation passed both houses, and
200
Governor Corzine, an opponent of capital punishment,
signed the
201
In
bill into law at a public ceremony on December 17, 2007.
anticipation of the repeal, Governor Corzine commuted the sentences
202
of the eight men who were on New Jersey’s death row.
In signing
the bill, Governor Corzine stated, “Today New Jersey is truly
evolving. . . . Society must determine if its endorsement of violence
begets violence and undermines the sanctity of life. . . . I answer yes,
and therefore I believe we must evolve to ending that
203
endorsement.”

196

Id. at 533–35.
See id.; Keith B. Richburg, N.J. Approves Abolition of Death Penalty; Corzine to
Sign, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2007, at A3.
198 Martin, supra note 188, at 537.
199 Richburg, supra note 197.
200 Jeremy W. Peters, New Jersey Moves to End Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2007, at B1.
201 Martin, supra note 188, at 537–38.
202 Id. at 538.
203 Deborah Howlett, Death Row Disappears as Corzine Signs Bill, STAR-LEDGER,
Dec. 18, 2007, at 1. Although there have been some efforts to reintroduce death penalty
legislation in New Jersey, those efforts have not been met with much enthusiasm and to
date have been unsuccessful. See Erik Larsen, Death Penalty Debate Is Revived in N.J.,
NJ.COM, Apr. 2, 2011, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/04/nj_death_penalty
_debate_is_rev.html.
197
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C. Illinois Legislative Abolition of Capital Punishment
In the spring of 2011, Illinois became the third and most recent
204
state to legislatively abolish capital punishment.
Drama,
corruption, and turmoil left an indelible mark on Illinois’s experience
205
Shortly after Furman, Illinois
with the modern death penalty.
amended its death penalty statute, setting out factors that would
render an offender eligible for death and also providing for a three206
judge panel to decide the sentence;
the Illinois Supreme Court,
however, struck down that statute as unconstitutional under both the
207
state and federal constitutions.
A new death penalty statute
enacted in 1977 appeared to follow the model sanctioned by
208
Gregg, although subsequent amendments to this statute broadened
209
Unlike New Mexico or
the crimes and criteria for death eligibility.
even New Jersey, Illinois had a sizeable death row. From 1977 to
210
2011, Illinois sentenced 311 individuals to death.
The state
executed twelve individuals and exonerated at least twenty other
211
condemned prisoners.
In early 2000, prompted by notorious cases of wrongful
convictions and death sentences, Governor George Ryan declared a
moratorium on executions and established a commission to study the
212
death penalty in Illinois.
The Commission released its report on
April 15, 2002. Although the Commission did not call for abolition
of the death penalty, it did set out a number of recommendations

204 John Schwartz & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Illinois Governor Signs Capital
Punishment Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, at A18.
205 See Christina McMahon, Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty, 16 PUB. INT. L. REP.
83 (2011).
206 ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 120, at 3.
207 People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham, 336 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1975); ILL. COMM’N ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 120.
208 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 2011); ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, supra note 120, at 3.
209 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 2011); ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, supra note 120, at 3.
210 McMahon, supra note 205, at 84; ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 120, at 5, 9 (indicating that when the Commission began its work, Illinois had
sentenced more than 250 individuals to death although more than half of these reversed on
appeal or subsequent review).
211 ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 120, at 5.
212 Id. at 1. For an interesting and personal reflection on the Commission, see SCOTT
TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER’S REFLECTION ON DEALING WITH THE
DEATH PENALTY (2003).
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including the following: videotaping the questioning of capital
suspects, reforms related to eyewitness identification, greatly limiting
death eligibility, greater review of prosecutorial decisions to seek the
death penalty, better training for capital lawyers, and requiring
213
proportionality review by the state supreme court.
Even though the Commission did not recommend abolishing the
death penalty, in 2003, Governor Ryan emptied the row by
commuting the sentences of 167 death row inmates to life and
214
pardoning four other condemned prisoners.
Nonetheless, Illinois’s
death penalty statute remained in effect after Ryan’s massive
commutation. After 2003, fifteen more capital offenders were
215
condemned to death,
although the state did not kill any of these
216
In 2011, the Illinois Coalition to Abolish the Death
individuals.
Penalty, as well as a number of other organizations, successfully
concluded a two-year legislative campaign to abolish the death
217
penalty in Illinois.
The debate in the state house and senate was
218
Supporters of the repeal
passionate and contentious on both sides.
raised passionate concerns about wrongful convictions and argued
219
persuasively the very real specter of executing an innocent person.
This concern proved compelling in Illinois, where there were a
220
significant number of well-publicized cases of exonerations.
Those favoring retention of the death penalty argued that it should be
available for the worst of the worst and to provide retribution for
221
victims and their families.
Like in New Mexico and New Jersey,
the savings from abolishing death row were to go, in part, to services

213 ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,

supra note 120, at i–ii.
Schwartz & Fitzsimmons, supra note 204.
215 Id.
216 See ILLINOIS COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www.icadp.org
/legislative-action (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
217 Id.
218 Schwartz & Fitzsimmons, supra note 204.
219 Steve Mills, What Killed Illinois’ Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 2011,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-03-10/news/ct-met-illinois-death-penalty-history
20110309_1_death-penalty-death-row-death-sentences; Schwartz & Fitzsimmons, supra
note 204; Todd Wilson & Ray Long, Illinois Death Penalty Ban Sent to Gov. Pat Quinn,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 2011, http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/2011/01/illinois
-death-penalty-ban-a-step-closer-to-governors-desk.html.
220 Mills, supra note 219; Schwartz & Fitzsimmons, supra note 204; Wilson & Long,
supra note 219.
221 Wilson & Long, supra note 219.
214
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for surviving members of the victim’s family.
In the end, the bill
passed both houses, and Governor Quinn, a Democrat and death
penalty supporter, signed the bill abolishing the death penalty in
223
Illinois.
Quinn also commuted the sentences of the remaining
224
In signing the
condemned prisoners on Illinois’s death row.
legislation, Governor Quinn stated,
We cannot have a death penalty system in our state that kills
innocent people. . . . Unfortunately that system was in grave danger
of doing exactly that in 20 different instances in Illinois. And so
what’s really in question is the system itself. If the system can’t be
guaranteed 100 percent error-free, then we shouldn’t have the
system. It cannot225
stand. It just is not right in our democracy and
system of justice.

Sixteen states have abolished the death penalty; four of these
sixteen states ended the death penalty in the last few years. This
abolition effort stands in marked contrast to the first thirty years of the
modern death penalty. Of course, this abolition effort did not occur
overnight, but rather was part of an ongoing effort by a number of
different individuals, organizations, and legislators who, for a variety
of reasons, wanted to end capital punishment in their state. The
efforts of New Mexico, New Jersey, and Illinois provide useful
guidance as to why this change occurred and what that change means
for the American death penalty system.

222 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/119-1(b) (West 2011) (“All unobligated and
unexpended moneys remaining in the Capital Litigation Trust Fund on the effective date of
this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly shall be transferred into the Death
Penalty Abolition Fund, a special fund in the State treasury, to be expended by the Illinois
Criminal Justice Information Authority, for services for families of victims of homicide or
murder and for training of law enforcement personnel.”); see Mary Massingale, House
Narrowly Approves Abolition of Death Penalty, ILL. STATEHOUSE NEWS, Jan. 6, 2011,
http://illinois.statehousenewsonline.com/4846/house-narrowly-approves-abolition-of-death
-penalty.
223 Christopher Wills, Illinois Death Penalty Abolished, State Clears Death Row,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 10, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News
-Wires/2011/0310/Illinois-death-penalty-abolished-state-clears-death-row.
224 Id.
225 Dave McKinney & Stephen Di Benedetto, Quinn Signs Bill Repealing Illinois Death
Penalty, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 9, 2011, http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/4225981
-418/gov.-pat-quinn-signs-bill-repealing-illinois-death-penalty; accord Patrick Yeagle,
Illinois Death Penalty Repealed, ILL. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2011, http://www.illinoistimes.com
/Springfield/article-8452-illinois-death-penal.html.
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V
END OF THE BEGINNING OF THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY
In rejecting the death penalty, New Mexico, New Jersey, and
Illinois found that the standards of decency of their states cannot
abide the risk of the state killing an innocent man or woman. The
danger of killing the wrong person is even more problematic in the
modern death penalty system, which faces intractable problems,
including lack of competent lawyers to represent capital offenders,
high economic costs, and the politicization of the judicial process.
Further, and on a more fundamental level, the modern death penalty
sets up a system that requires juries to do two incompatible tasks: (1)
give a rational, reasoned determination of whether the defendant is
eligible for the death penalty, and (2) use discretion to spare the life of
an offender if warranted. As Justice Blackmun recognized, these
226
goals are inconsistent, incompatible, and ultimately unworkable.
But more than that, the death penalty asks the jury to always get it
right. That is, convict the right man or woman and assure that a death
sentence is proper in each particular case. As the governors in New
Mexico, New Jersey, and Illinois indicated when they signed the
repeal legislation into law, this task is not one that the modern death
penalty is capable of achieving.
It is also interesting to note that the abolition efforts occurred after
the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. One might think
that the terrorist attacks, and the accompanying insecurity that the
nation might feel about its safety would ramp up support for the death
penalty. Surveys show, however, that, while a majority of Americans
support capital punishment, when offered the life without the
possibility of parole as a sentencing option, the support for the death
227
penalty drops.
Increased attention on wrongful convictions, and
the mounting number of wrongful convictions, adds further doubts
about the reliability of the death penalty. Indeed, politicians in three
very different states, in different parts of the country, voted against
the death penalty without political ramifications. These actions
indicate an important shift in the death penalty debate.

226 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143–59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
227 Frank Mace, It’s Time to Kill the Death Penalty, HARV. POL. REV., Sept. 26, 2011,
http://hpronline.org/united-states/its-time-to-kill-the-death-penalty.
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Yet, this observation should not be overstated. No state in the
Deep South has abolished the death penalty, and as demonstrated
recently in Texas and Georgia, these states have no qualms about
carrying out executions. At most, North Carolina has addressed some
important death penalty issues in enacting the Racial Justice Act, and
Maryland has tightened the evidentiary standards in death penalty
cases. Until there is a successful abolition of the death penalty in the
states in the Old Confederacy, however, the death penalty will remain
an entrenched part of the American landscape.
The danger of executing an innocent man or woman loomed large
in the recent abolition debates. The importance and prominence of
this concern has increased dramatically in the last ten to fifteen years
as DNA and other evidence have resulted in the exoneration of more
than 130 condemned prisoners. Illinois, in particular, faced the
daunting reality that the State sent as many as twenty innocent men to
death row. In New Mexico, the testimony of Juan Melendez had a
significant impact on the debate. The conversation about the death
penalty now poses the very real question of whether we as a society
can live with killing innocent people as part of our death penalty
ritual.
Related to this concern is the option of sentencing someone to life
without the possibility of parole. In all three states that recently
abolished the death penalty, it was replaced with a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole. This sentencing option provides an
alternative that assures public safety by keeping the offender out of
society until the end of his or her life.
Another issue of significance in the abolition efforts is the high
economic cost of the death penalty. In New Jersey this issue played a
compelling role, particularly given that the state had not executed
anyone who had been sentenced to death in the modern era. The
legislature found it important that the cost did not deliver the intended
punishment––an execution. Moreover, in all three states the savings,
or at least part of the savings, derived from the death penalty were to
be tied to services for the surviving victim’s family. This factor may
have been critical. One of the main arguments for continuing the
death penalty is to vindicate the loss of the victim to society and to his
or her family. It is important not to forget that the crime at issue in
these cases is murder––frequently a senseless, horrible murder––and a
number of individuals suffer as a result of that murder. The
emotional tug for those supporting the death penalty is the appeal of
vindication or closure for the surviving members of the victim’s
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family. The successful abolition lobbying efforts also focused on the
victim’s family and the failures of the death penalty system to meet
the needs of these individuals who are truly aggrieved by the
defendant’s actions.
In signing the law repealing New Jersey’s death penalty statute,
Governor Corzine stated that New Jersey was evolving. To what
extent then do the recent legislative abolition actions affect the
evolution of the standards of decency that frame the Eighth
Amendment? In Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy the Court sought a
national consensus that states have rejected a particular punishment as
inconsistent with evolving standards of decency. The actions in New
York, New Mexico, New Jersey, and Illinois to some extent indicate
that at least some states have found that the death penalty is
inconsistent with their state’s standards of decency. Yet thirty-four
states still have the death penalty, which is only one fewer than the
number of states that revised their death penalty statutes after
Furman. The number of total abolition states is not yet comparable to
the numbers the Court found persuasive in Atkins and Roper when the
Court found that the imposition of the death penalty on mentally
retarded and juvenile offenders violated evolving standards of
decency. It is unlikely, then, that at this point of time, the Supreme
Court would find that the evolving standards of the Eighth
Amendment preclude the death penalty.
The struggle for abolition has turned a corner, but a long road lies
ahead. The next stage of the death penalty debate will be fought in
the state legislatures. If the three recent abolition states are any guide,
this fight will be contentious and emotional. It will also shape the
course of capital punishment in the United States in the twenty-first
century.
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